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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Five years after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and three years after Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,2 the question regarding the impact these seminal Supreme Court decisions are 
having on the vitality of employment discrimination and other civil rights cases 
remains. This question was posed at a symposium aptly titled Trial by Jury or Trial by 
Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment Discrimination, sponsored by the 
New York Law School Law Review and The Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for 
Law & Policy held in April 2012.3 This question is important because if potentially 
meritorious civil rights and employment discrimination cases are dismissed 
prematurely, law enforcement and deterrence will be sacrificed for expediency and 
efficiency. The answer to this question is that we don’t know yet. The jury is still out. 
Or, more accurately, the judge is still out since most cases currently never get to a jury. 
Trial by motion has become standard operating procedure for modern civil litigation, 
with the point of dismissal far earlier in the litigation cycle.
 For the five decades prior to Twombly and Iqbal, “notice pleading” dominated the 
pleading system in federal courts. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a claimant was only required to make “a short and plain statement” of the 
claim.4 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson, instructed that a claim should 
be dismissed only if there was “no set of facts in support of [the plaintiff ’s] claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”5 However, following Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff 
must include enough facts to make his claim not only possible, but also “plausible,”6 a 
significantly higher bar than the Conley “no set of facts” standard.
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are trans-substantive, i.e., they apply to all 
civil cases regardless of the subject matter, unless exempted by the rules or by statute.7 
However, many scholars—myself included—have worried that after Twombly and 
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment Discrimination, N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.nylslawreview.com/trial-by-jury-or-trial-by-motion-summary-
judgment-iqbal-and-employment-discrimination/.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). All Rule mentions in this article refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
unless otherwise specified.
5. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
6. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to 
dismiss.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 557 (citation omitted) (holding that “[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”; they must show a “plausibility of 
‘entitle[ment] to relief,’” not just a possibility). Building on Twombly, Iqbal explained that “[a] claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, 
plausibility falls somewhere between possibility and probability. Id.
7. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 
DePaul L. Rev. 371, 372 (2010).
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Iqbal, litigants bringing employment discrimination8 and other civil rights cases9 will 
have an even more formidable climb over the higher pleadings bar.10 This is particularly 
true for intentional discrimination claims, which are more vulnerable to dismissal 
post-Twombly and Iqbal for numerous reasons.11 Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a 
number of legal scholars have sought to quantitatively determine the decisions’ impact 
on civil rights litigation by comparing the amount and success rate of Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions before and after Twombly and Iqbal. Early studies by a variety of scholars 
suggest that the decisions resulted in an increase in the filing and granting of pre-trial 
motions to dismiss.12 However, a more recent study by the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC) suggests that, despite an increase in both the filings and success rate of 12(b)(6) 
8. These include cases that are typically brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other similar federal civil rights statutes.
9. These include cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), alleging a government official 
deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional right, and to other federal civil rights statutes.
10. See Raymond Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing 
Discrimination, 100 Ky. L.J. 235, 284–85 (2011–2012) (concluding that plaintiffs in employment and 
housing cases were more likely to face motions to dismiss and that courts were more likely to grant such 
motions post-Iqbal, and suggesting that these decisions are having a chilling effect, resulting in plaintiffs 
settling or not bringing claims at all); Edward A. Hartnett, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial 
Practice: Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (2010) (discussing ways to limit the 
negative impact of Twombly and Iqbal on plaintiffs, including allowing discovery during the pleading 
stage); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 Ohio N.U. L. 
Rev. 621, 623–31 (2011) [hereinafter Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles] (discussing recent 
procedural changes that have made it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to bring claims, including 
the challenges raised by the tougher pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal); Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental 
Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 65 (2010) [hereinafter Malveaux, Front 
Loading and Heavy Lifting] (discussing the difficulties faced by civil rights plaintiffs as a result of 
Twombly and Iqbal and suggesting that allowing increased discovery before deciding a 12(b)(6) motion 
would help mitigate the impact on civil rights cases); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing Iqbal ’s 
effect on civil cases generally, but also focusing on the particular challenges in civil rights cases due to 
informational asymmetry); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517 
(2010) (considering recent changes to pretrial practice, including pleadings, that have made it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to bring civil rights and employment discrimination cases); Joseph A. Seiner, 
Plausibility & Disparate Impact, 64 Hastings L.J. 287 (2013) (examining the application of Twombly 
and Iqbal to disparate impact discrimination cases and suggesting that plaintiffs should only be required 
to plead facts related to their prima facie case, and not additional facts related to the employer’s business 
justification); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 Lewis & Clark 
L. Rev. 185 (2010) (discussing Iqbal as another marker in the evolution of a more restrictive procedural 
doctrine); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and 
Twombly, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15 (2010) (arguing that the post-Twombly and Iqbal pleading 
standard essentially equates to the summary judgment standard and unfairly puts the plaintiff in a 
position of having to plead facts before undertaking discovery).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.A.
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motions, this change is not necessarily attributable to the pleading standard announced 
in Twombly and Iqbal.13
 This article concludes that, in light of conflicting empirical studies and analysis, 
the impact of Twombly and Iqbal remains elusive, and that empirical data alone 
cannot answer this question. Although the varied quantitative studies offer important 
insights, lawmakers and scholars seeking to understand the effect of these decisions 
on civil rights litigation should consider non-empirical data, such as the boots-on-
the-ground experiences and practices of judges and lawyers in the post-Twombly and 
Iqbal landscape.
 This article is comprised of five parts. Part I introduces the topic. Part II analyzes 
the Iqbal decision and discusses why civil rights cases are more susceptible to dismissal 
under this regime. Part III reviews early quantitative studies, the Federal Judicial 
Center report, and more recent criticisms of both. This part also suggests that none 
of these studies is the definitive word on the new pleading regime’s impact on civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases. Part IV concludes that, in order to 
accurately gauge how Twombly and Iqbal have affected civil rights cases, it is necessary 
to consider both anecdotal evidence from lawyers and trends in how judges are 
applying the new standard. In closing, this article concludes that although plaintiffs 
are facing more motions to dismiss post-Twombly and Iqbal, the degree to which 
these decisions are resulting in premature dismissals remains unclear.
ii. iQbaL’s grEatEr disMissaL risK fOr EMpLOYMEnt disCriMinatiOn and 
OthEr CiViL rights LitigatiOn
 Following the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, legal scholars identified the potential 
detrimental impact such decisions might have on civil rights cases. There are multiple 
reasons why such cases are susceptible to greater risk of dismissal, as set forth in this 
section.14
 A.  Civil Rights Plaintiffs Often Plead Facts That Are Consistent with Both Legal 
and Illegal Behavior
 First, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination in her complaint often tells a 
story whose facts are consistent with both legal and illegal behavior. This is not 
surprising because, at the very beginning of a lawsuit, plaintiffs can only put forward 
information that they were able to gather through their own diligent investigation. 
No one has had a chance to engage in the formal discovery process, where the parties 
are compelled to turn over important information to the other side. But under the 
new pleading standard, plaintiffs must allege facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely 
consistent with)” illegal conduct.15
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. These reasons were previously discussed in my articles Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles, supra 
note 10, at 623–28, and Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting, supra note 10, at 87–101. The 
following discussion is drawn from these prior works.
15. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
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 This makes it tricky for a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination to survive 
dismissal. To prove liability, a plaintiff has to prove that the defendant’s adverse 
action was because of some impermissible factor; it’s what motivated the defendant. 
But at the early pleading stage, a defendant’s conduct can suggest a discriminatory 
motive or a purely innocent one—indistinguishable from each other. This means 
that pre-discovery, a plaintiff may not be able to eliminate innocence as a credible 
explanation—resulting in dismissal.
 This was true in Iqbal. There, Javaid Iqbal was detained and held on various 
charges immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks because of his designation as 
a person of “high interest.”16 Iqbal, a Pakistani who ultimately pled guilty to criminal 
charges and served his time, alleged that he had been mistreated by federal officials 
while in a special, maximum-security unit, in violation of his constitutional rights.17 
More specifically, he contended that then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller designated him a person of “high interest” and subjected 
him to harsh conditions of confinement because of his race, religion, or national 
origin, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.18 His complaint alleged that 
these constitutional violations were a matter of policy for which Ashcroft and Mueller 
were personally responsible.19
 Iqbal’s factual allegations were consistent with both illegal and legal conduct. On 
the one hand, the facts could explain invidious discrimination, meaning the 
government targeted and subjected Iqbal to mistreatment because of his race, 
religion, or national origin.20 On the other hand, the facts could explain legitimate 
anti-terrorism activity, meaning the government detained Iqbal as part of a neutral 
anti-terrorism strategy.21 At the pleading stage, without the benefit of discovery, it 
was too early to tell.22
 B. The Iqbal Plausibility Test Is Overly Subjective
 Second, because of its overly subjective nature, the new plausibility test23—to be 
determined by “ judicial experience and common sense”24—fails to give judges enough 
16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009).
17. Id. at 666, 668.
18. Id. at 667–69.
19. Id. at 666.
20. Id. at 681.
21. Id. (“Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees 
‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations, 
they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”).
22. Perhaps discovery of government memoranda or depositions of officials could have tested Iqbal’s claims.
23. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged”).
24. Id. at 679.
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guidance on how to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed. Based on 
the differences among judges, one judge may dismiss a complaint, while another 
judge may conclude that an identical complaint survives, solely because of the way in 
which each judge applies his or her “ judicial experience and common sense.” This is 
bound to create unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion. Further, this may 
be particularly problematic for cases alleging civil rights violations.
 For example, studies indicate that there are significant differences in perception 
among racial groups over the existence and pervasiveness of race discrimination.25 
With the election of Barack Obama, the first African American President, there has 
been a particularly acute focus on whether American society has become “post-racial.” 
Following this historic election, many Americans have concluded that race 
discrimination is no longer a significant issue.26 Consequently, some judges, like many 
Americans, may operate from the presumption that race discrimination is a thing of 
the past. This perception may lead a judge to conclude that, based on the facts before 
him, intentional discrimination is implausible, especially in light of alternative 
explanations available. Without a suitable legal standard in which to anchor the 
plausibility determinations, judges are vulnerable to the criticism that their decisions 
25. See Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic Outlook But Enduring Racial 
Division, in How Race Is Lived in America: Pulling Together, Pulling Apart 385 app. (2001) 
(noting that 44% of African Americans believe they are treated less fairly than whites in the workplace, 
while 73% of whites believe African Americans are treated fairly); Gary Langer & Peyton M. Craighill, 
Fewer Call Racism a Major Problem Though Discrimination Remains, ABCNews.com (Jan. 18, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/story?id=6674407&page=1 (“[African Americans] remain 
twice as likely as whites to call racism a big problem (44 percent vs. 22 percent), and only half as likely 
to say African-Americans have achieved equality.”); K.A. Dixon et al., A Workplace Divided: 
How Americans View Discrimination and Race on the Job 8 (2002), available at http://www.
heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/f iles/content/A_Workplace_Divided.pdf (f inding that African 
American employees are five times more likely than their white counterparts to believe that African 
Americans are the most likely victims of discrimination; 50% of African American employees believe 
employment practices are fair, in comparison to 90% of their white counterparts).
26. See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration, 98 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1023, 1066 (2010) (“Partly through colorblindness and partly through the accumulated weight of 
cultural beliefs and historical practices, most Americans accept that major American institutions are 
race-neutral and that these institutions produce vast racial disparities.”); see also PBS NewsHour: Debate 
on Race Emerges as Obama’s Policies Take Shape (PBS television broadcast Sept. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec09/rage_09-16.html. For example, in a discussion 
among columnists and academics with Gwen Ifill, Democratic pollster Cornell Belcher concluded:
We’re two very different countries racially, where right now you have a majority of 
whites who, frankly, do think we’re post-racial because they think African-Americans 
have the same advantages as they do, while African-Americans do not. And you have a 
large swath of whites right now who are just as likely to see reverse discrimination as an 
issue as classic discrimination.
 Id. But see Associated Press, Ex-President Sees Racism in Outburst, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2009, at A14 
(attributing Representative Joe Wilson’s outburst during President Obama’s health care speech as “based 
on racism” and noting that “[t]here is an inherent feeling among many in this country that an African-
American should not be president”); Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Say Racism Against Blacks 
Widespread, Gallup, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/109258/Majority-Americans-Say-
Racism-Against-Blacks-Widespread.aspx.
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are based on factors outside of the law.27 This excessive subjectivity can result in 
different outcomes depending not on the facts, but on the identity of the judge.28
 In Iqbal itself, the Supreme Court concluded that the factual allegations, taken as 
true, were consistent with intentional illegal discrimination, but then found that 
these allegations were not as likely as a more innocent rationale.29 The arrest and 
detention of thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the FBI’s post-9/11 terrorism 
investigation could mean that Ashcroft and Mueller intentionally designated such 
detainees as persons of “high interest” on the grounds of race, religion, or national 
origin. But a more benign reason could explain the same conduct: i.e., Ashcroft and 
Mueller instituted a legitimate anti-terrorism policy that happened to have a disparate 
impact on Arab Muslim men because of the connection between the 9/11 attack and 
its perpetrators.30 In comparing the plaintiff ’s intentional discrimination theory to 
the defendants’ more innocent one, the Court rejected the plaintiff ’s theory as 
implausible on the ground that it was less likely.31
 As illustrated in Iqbal ’s five-to-four decision, likelihood is in the eye of the 
beholder, and is based on the limited evidence available pre-discovery. But a court is 
not supposed to weigh the relative merits of alternative theories at the pleading stage, 
before both parties have had an opportunity to collect evidence to prove their case.32 
These kinds of judgment calls are to be made by a jury after everyone has had a 
chance to gather evidence and argue the merits.
 C.  Lack of Discovery Makes It Difficult for Plaintiffs to Sufficiently Plead Facts 
Showing Intentional Discrimination
 Finally, discriminatory intent is often difficult, if not impossible, to unearth 
before the parties have had some discovery. Discrimination has become more subtle 
27. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 286 n.153 (citation omitted) (“It is always possible that implicit bias may be 
infecting these decisions to dismiss discrimination claims, and the Twombly/Iqbal precedents play into 
unconscious bias within the judges ‘experience and common sense.’”)
28. Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1195 (2009) (finding that judges harbor implicit biases); Paul Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107 (2010) (analyzing the “cultural cognition theory” in labor and employment law 
and finding that judges backgrounds impact their decisions); see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
29. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (“Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully 
designating detainees ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin.”).
30. Id. at 682.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading 
standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.”); Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 
499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[R]uling on a motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not an occasion 
for the court to make findings of fact.”).
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and institutional.33 It can be harder to detect because it is less overt and transparent; 
instead it takes the form of stereotypes and unconscious bias.34
 Moreover, it is hard for plaintiffs to unearth discrimination because of the 
unequal access parties may have to evidence. In the absence of discovery, it is 
particularly difficult for civil rights claims to survive dismissal when plaintiffs cannot 
access information that is exclusively in the defendant’s possession, such as evidence 
of a defendant’s intent or institutional practices. This unequal access to information—
informational asymmetry—between the parties is unfair and puts plaintiffs at a 
significant disadvantage when challenging the misconduct of employers, corporations, 
and other institutions.35
33. See Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 86 (2009) (testimony of Debo P. 
Adegbile, Director of Litigation of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.); Natasha T. 
Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary 
Workplace, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1117, 1138–61 (2008); id. at 1146 (“The reality is that the root of the 
discrimination remains concealed in the web of modern workplace design, including work teams and 
collective decision-making processes.”); see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 
Calif. L. Rev. 623, 646–48 (2005) (noting that work culture may perpetuate discrimination); Tristin 
K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 
659, 661 (2003) (noting that class actions can “identify and address organizational sources of 
discrimination”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 458, 460 (2001) (“‘Second generation’ claims involve social practices and patterns of 
interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups. Exclusion 
is frequently difficult to trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors, and may 
sometimes be visible only in the aggregate. Structures of decisionmaking, opportunity, and power fail to 
surface these patterns of exclusion, and themselves produce differential access and opportunity.”).
34. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 743 
(2005) (“Contemporary sociological and psychological research reveals that discriminatory biases and 
stereotypes are pervasive, even among well-meaning people. In fact, recent studies have focused 
particular attention on the unconscious biases of people whose consciously held beliefs are strongly 
egalitarian.”); see also John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and 
Interracial Distrust, 8 Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychol. 88, 94 (2002); John F. 
Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. Soc. Issues 829, 831 (2001); 
John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 
Psychol. Sci. 315, 315 (2000) (“[M]any people who explicitly support egalitarian principles and believe 
themselves to be nonprejudiced also unconsciously harbor negative feelings and beliefs about blacks and 
other historically disadvantaged groups.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 
1164, 1186–88 (1995); Lawrence, supra note 28, at 322 (“[W]e are all racists.”); David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899, 901–902 (1993) (quoting Lawrence, 
supra, at 337–39) (“‘Thus, through personal and cultural experience the individual comes to associate 
characteristics such as “intelligence,” “laziness,” “honesty,” or “dirtiness” with classifications of people.’ 
Since our ‘categorization’ of people is learned and experienced at a very young age, we may not be 
conscious of having internalized those feelings and beliefs.”).
35. See Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 52 How. L.J. 31, 68–69 
(2008). Professor Brooks explains:
[The Plausibility pleading rule] disadvantages the prosecution of civil rights cases 
because it imposes a difficult, if not impossible, burden on the plaintiff to make specific 
factual allegations about evidence (or ‘proof ’) known only to defendants. For example, 
evidence of discriminatory animus or institutional practices is typically not revealed to 
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 Plaintiffs are caught in a catch-22. They must put facts in their complaint to 
nudge their claim from possible to plausible. Often the only way to get such facts is 
through discovery. But the court will not permit discovery unless the plaintiffs 
provide the very facts they cannot discover. Thus, plaintiffs’ complaints die on the 
vine not because they lack merit, but because plaintiffs do not have the same access 
to information that the defendants do. By raising the pleading bar to plausibility, the 
Supreme Court has created an untenable situation for plaintiffs challenging 
discrimination where there is informational asymmetry.
iii. EXaMinatiOn Of pOst-tWOMbLY and iQbaL EMpiriCaL stUdiEs
 So what has been the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the survival of civil rights 
cases? Have our worst fears been realized? Not surprisingly, empirical evidence 
indicates that post-Twombly and Iqbal, defendants are filing more motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. Studies by the FJC, among others, note a statistically 
significant increase in the filing rate of 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss following the 
elevated pleading requirement, which can be attributed to Twombly and Iqbal.36 This 
is true not only generally, but also for employment discrimination cases and non-
prisoner civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in particular.37 In general, 
the plaintiff until discovery; yet, under the [plausibility pleading rule], the plaintiff is 
forced to plead such undiscovered evidence or face early dismissal of his or her civil 
rights claim. Cases are dismissed without ever reaching the merits.
 Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent 
Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 935, 957 (1990) (noting that 
the plaintiff in Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985), would not normally have the 
requisite factual predicate to show the city had a “custom and practice” of discrimination pre-discovery, 
thereby making it “nearly impossible” for his civil rights claim to escape 12(b)(6) dismissal); Scott 
Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 135, 138–39 
(2007) (noting the same occurrence in the antitrust context); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff 
with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over 
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1217, 1261–62 (2008) (criticizing Twombly for “informational asymmetries”); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2009) (“[A] standard 
that dismisses valid claims at the very front end of the system based on an inability to offer facts that 
claimants are, at this early stage, unlikely or unable to know blocks access to the courts in a way that is 
fundamentally improper.”); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 
82 St. John’s L. Rev. 893, 912 (2008).
36. Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to 
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 8 (2011); Lonny Hoffman, 
Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 
Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2012) (relying on FJC study to conclude that “[a]fter Iqbal, a plaintiff was twice 
as likely to face a motion to dismiss as compared with the period before Twombly”); Thomas E. 
Willging, Use of Rule 12(b)(6) in Two Federal District Courts tbl.4 (1989) (presenting statistics 
for the pre-Twombly and Iqbal period). Professor Brescia confirmed this trend post-Iqbal for motions 
that specifically challenge a complaint’s factual allegations. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 262 (“[P]
laintiffs faced a considerably higher number of motions to dismiss in which their pleadings were 
challenged as lacking specificity.”).
37. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 8–9 (2011) (noting the likelihood of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim being filed goes from 10.5% in 2006 to 12.4% in 2010 for civil rights cases). In civil rights 
cases, the likelihood of a motion to dismiss being filed increased, but was not statistically significant at 
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under the new pleading regime, plaintiffs are twice as likely to face this dispositive 
motion; the probability has doubled from roughly 3% to 6%.38 For employment 
discrimination cases, the probability went from 7.7% to 10.1%;39 and for civil rights 
cases, it went from 11.7% to 12.7%.40 Defendants readily admit to strategically filing 
motions to dismiss as a matter of course,41 and the statistics bear this out. The 
consequence of this trend is that plaintiffs have to expend greater time and money to 
stave off early dismissal,42 a luxury not afforded to everyone.43
 Given the greater propensity for defendants to try to eliminate cases right out of 
the gate, has this trend led to an increase in the dismissal rates of civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases post-Twombly and Iqbal? Here, the empirical data 
are mixed.
 A. Early Studies Attribute the Rise in Dismissals to Twombly and Iqbal
 On the one hand, in earlier studies, a number of legal scholars found that the 
more rigorous pleading standard resulted in a greater dismissal rate for civil right and 
employment discrimination cases. For example, comparing 12(b)(6) orders shortly 
before and after Twombly, Kendall W. Hannon concluded that under Twombly, a 
civil rights action alleging a constitutional violation44 was “39.6% more likely to be 
the 0.05 level. Id. at 8. For the subcategory of civil rights cases involving non-prisoner § 1983 cases, 
however, there was a statistically significant increase at the 0.05 level. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 10 & tbl.2 (noting the probability of filing went from 2.9% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2010, controlling 
for federal district court and case type); Hoffman, supra note 36, at 15.
39. Cecil et al., supra note 36, tbl.2.
40. Id.; see also Brescia, supra note 10, at 280–83 (stating plaintiffs in employment and housing discrimination 
cases are far more likely to face a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on factual specificity grounds post-Iqbal 
than pre-Twombly).
41. See, e.g., John C.S. Pierce & D. Kirby Howard, To Twombly or Not to Twombly—That is the Question, 
For the Defense, Sept. 2009, at 89, available at http://forthedefense.org/articles/2009/09_September/
FTD-0909-PierceHoward.pdf (suggesting that after the Twombly decision defense attorneys “have an 
opportunity and even an obligation to test the strength of poorly pled claims [by filing 12(b)(6) 
motions]”). Similarly, attorney John A. Freedman, a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP explained, “I 
think now I’m more likely to advise a client that given the Supreme Court’s guidance on [12(b)(6) 
motions], yes, you ought to look more seriously at filing a [12(b)(6)] motion [but] don’t count on it being 
granted.” ACS Convention Panel: Access to Federal Courts after Iqbal and Twombly, Am. Constitution 
Soc’y for L. and Pol’y (July 18, 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/acs-convention-panel-
access-to-federal-courts-after-iqbal-and-twombly.
42. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 821, 
840–41 (2010) (predicting additional costs for plaintiffs as a result of anticipated increase in 12(b)(6) 
motions); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 603, 633 (2012) (noting additional 12(b)(6) motions result in “higher costs for 
litigants and more work for federal judges”).
43. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 16.
44. Hannon’s civil rights claims are constitutional claims. More specifically, he defines “civil rights” claims 
as those “brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 (and § 1983’s counterpart against federal 
officials—so-called Bivens actions), and 1985 as well as generalized claims of due process or equal 
protection violations.” Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of 
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dismissed than a random case in the set,”45 and was more likely to be dismissed after 
Twombly than before.46 Professor Joseph A. Seiner picked up where Hannon left off 
by conducting a similar study that focused on the impact of Twombly on cases 
alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.47 Comparing the dismissal rate of employment discrimination cases one year 
before and after Twombly, Professor Seiner discovered a 2% increase post-Twombly.48 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1811, 1836 n.161 (2008). 
Excluded from the “civil rights” category were actions brought under statutes such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA). Id. These actions were categorized as “Federal Other,” for which there 
wasn’t sufficient data to conduct a meaningful analysis. Id. at 1836 & n.161.
45. Id. at 1838. “This result was statistically significant to the 0.05 level.” Id.
46. Id. at 1837. A motion to dismiss a civil rights case was likely to be granted 41.7% of the time before 
Twombly, and 52.9% after Twombly. Id. The study did not examine whether there was a difference 
between motions granted with or without prejudice.
  The Hannon study analyzed 3287 federal district court orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion. 
Id. at 1836. The study compared cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with those that 
cited Twombly in the seven months after it was decided. Id. The study examined only those orders 
published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 1829. The study excluded fraud cases governed by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity pleading standard, cases brought under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, which are subject to a more stringent standard under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.), and in forma pauperis and pro se cases, 
which are arguably subjected to a lower pleading standard. Id. at 1829–34. Cases were also removed 
from the database if they did not ref lect the “spirit” of the search. Id. at 1834. These included cases 
involving motions for summary judgment, to amend, to reconsider a ruling, or to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
  The methodology has its advantages and disadvantages. Drawbacks of the methodology include its 
exclusive reliance on the Westlaw electronic database, and its timing. Only seven months post-Twombly, 
district courts did not have the benefit of appellate guidance on the appropriate understanding and 
application of the new pleading standard, and some were seemingly unaware of the standard altogether. 
Id. at 1830. On the other hand, the timing was also advantageous. Because the “vast majority” of cases 
involved complaints drafted pre-Twombly, the change in dismissal rate can more readily be attributed to 
the change in pleading standard rather than a change in attorney drafting. Id. at 1831.
47. Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1011, 1027 (2009). The Seiner study analyzed 396 federal district court 
orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion in a Title VII case. Id. at 1029. The study compared 191 
cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with 205 that cited Twombly in the year after it was 
decided. Id. The study examined only those orders published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 1027–28. 
In contrast to Hannon, Seiner included cases brought by pro se litigants. Id. at 1029 n.134.
  Because Seiner’s methodology is similar to Hannon’s, their studies share many of the same 
strengths and weaknesses. See id. at 1029, 1031; see also supra text accompanying note 46. In addition, 
given that Seiner’s study examines only 396 cases, it is admittedly “difficult to draw any concrete 
conclusions from a purely mathematical perspective” and the results are not statistically significant. 
Seiner, supra, at 1030 n.140, 1032.
48. Seiner, supra note 47, at 1029–31. More specifically, in the pre-Twombly year, 54.5% of the federal 
district court orders granted the motion to dismiss in whole, while in the post-Twombly year, 57.1% 
granted the motion. Id. at 1029. Additionally, in the pre-Twombly year, 77.6% of the court orders 
granted the motion to dismiss (in whole or in part), while in the post-Twombly year, 75.4% granted the 
motion. Id. at 1030.
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Professor Seiner also duplicated his study for cases alleging employment 
discrimination under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or 
employment-related retaliation under Title V of the ADA.49 Again, comparing the 
dismissal rates one year before and after Twombly, Professor Seiner found a similar 
increase in the dismissal rate of cases under the ADA post-Twombly.50 In another 
study, Professor Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore found that dismissal orders in general 
increased from 46% to 48% to 56% two years before Twombly, two years after 
Twombly, and immediately following Iqbal, respectively.51 For dismissal orders in 
49. Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 115–16 (2010). The Seiner study analyzed 124 
federal district court orders that responded to a 12(b)(6) motion in cases involving either Title I ADA 
employment discrimination claims or Title VI ADA employment-related retaliation claims. Id. at 116–
17. The study compared fifty-nine cases that cited Conley in the year prior to Twombly with sixty-five 
that cited Twombly in the year after it was decided. The study examined only those orders published in 
the Westlaw database. Id. The study included cases brought by pro se litigants. Id. at 117.
  Seiner’s ADA study shares the same strengths and weaknesses of his prior Title VI study. See id. 
at 118–21; see also Hoffman, supra note 36, at 16. Because Seiner’s ADA study examines even fewer cases 
than the Title VII study (only 124), the ADA study makes it even more “difficult to draw any substantial 
conclusions regarding the resulting differentials between data sets” from a “purely numerical standpoint.” 
Seiner, supra, at 119. Again, the results were not statistically significant. Id. at 118–19.
50. Seiner, supra note 49, at 118, 120 (2010). More specifically, in the pre-Twombly years, 54.2% of the 
federal district court orders granted the motions to dismiss in whole, while in the post-Twombly years, 
64.6% granted such motions. Id. at 120. Additionally, in the pre-Twombly year, 64.4% of the court 
orders granted the motion to dismiss (in whole or in part), while in the post-Twombly years, such 
granting increased to 78.5%. Id. at 120–21. Thus, there was a 14.1% increase in the rate at which ADA 
cases were partially dismissed post-Twombly. Id. at 121.
  Although Seiner found an increase in the dismissal rates for both Title VII and ADA cases, he did 
not find the judicial reaction to these cases to be the same. In the disability context, there has been more 
confusion and inconsistency over the meaning and application of the plausibility standard. Id. at 121–26.
51. Hatamyar, supra note 42, at 556. This result was not statistically significant. Id. at 602 (noting the 
probability of this distribution occurring by chance is 15.2%—“too high for conventional statistical 
significance”).
  The Hatamyar Moore study randomly selected 500 federal district court opinions ruling on a 
12(b)(6) motion in the two years before Twombly, 500 in the two years after Twombly, and 200 in the six 
months following Iqbal. Id. at 555–56. The study examined only those orders published in the Westlaw 
database. Id. at 584. The study excluded prisoner litigation brought under the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. at 585. The study also excluded dismissals on grounds 
other than 12(b)(6), such as lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to 
join an indispensable party, and summary judgment. Id. at 586. Cases involving a more rigorous 
pleading standard—such as those alleging fraud or a PSLRA violation—were also excluded. Id. at 587. 
The study included 12(c) motions for judgments on the pleadings and 12(b)(6) motions from any 
opposing party, such as counterclaims. Id. at 588. The study also included pro se cases. After applying 
these exclusions and inclusions, Hatamyar Moore examined a total of 1039 cases in the database: 444 
under Conley, 422 under Twombly, and 173 under Iqbal. Id. at 585. Like the Hannon and Seiner studies, 
Hatamyar Moore’s initial study advises the reader to exercise caution when interpreting the data because 
of the small data pool and time period involving Iqbal decisions. Id. at 556.
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civil rights cases,52 the increase went from 50% to 53% to 58% for the same periods, 
respectively.53
 B.  The Federal Judicial Center Study Finds That Twombly and Iqbal Have No 
Statistically Significant Impact on the Dismissal Rate
 On the other hand, in 2011, the FJC’s empirical studies set forth an alternative 
interpretation of the fate of employment discrimination and civil rights cases. 
Commissioned by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the 
FJC published a report in March of 2011 and an update the following November, 
comparing motion practice in 2006 and 2010.
 In its favor, the FJC’s study had the benefit of more time and a greater data pool. 
By the time the FJC conducted its analysis, the legal landscape—previously littered 
with contradictory district court opinions—had been cleaned up by courts of appeals. 
The appellate courts had reversed some of the dismissals and clarified the appropriate 
application of the new pleading standard.54 The FJC also benefitted by having access 
to federal district court records, rather than being limited to electronic databases like 
Westlaw and Lexis. While there is disagreement over whether electronic databases 
52. Hatamyar Moore categorized type of cases by those listed on the federal district court docket sheet. 
Because the vast majority of cases identified as “Prison Petitions” alleged civil rights violations, she 
included this category in the “Civil Rights” category. The “Civil Rights” category is comprised of:
[1]  Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional violations, whether or 
not they purported to bring the case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the 
law), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
(conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), or Bivens actions.
[2]  Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged unlawful employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.
[3]  Cases in which the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), or the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
[4] Any other civil rights actions, including sex discrimination under Title IX.
 Id. at 591–92.
53. Id. at 607. Disaggregating this further for dismissal orders in constitutional civil rights cases, the 
increase went from 50% to 55% to 60%, and for dismissal orders in Title VII cases, the increase went 
from 42% to 54% to 53%. Id. at 608–09.
54. See Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 2–3 n.6 (citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that provide clarification of the Twombly and Iqbal 
pleading standard, some of which have resulted in reversals of dismissals). For more recent reversals, see 
also Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (reversing the dismissal of a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim by an employee in the Governor of Puerto Rico’s mansion against the Governor 
and other officials) and Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010)) (reversing the dismissal of an 
administrative assistant’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim against her employer, and 
providing an example of what an employment discrimination plaintiff must plead to survive a 12(b)(6) 
motion: “[a] plaintiff who believes that she has been passed over for a promotion because of her sex will 
be able to plead that she was employed by Company X, that a promotion was offered, that she applied 
and was qualified for it, and that the job went to someone else”).
732
The Jury (or More AccurATely The Judge) is sTill ouT
over-represent dismissals and therefore skew outcomes,55 it was to the FJC’s advantage 
to have a more complete dataset for analysis.
 The FJC’s study, like other initial studies, found that the percentage of motions 
to dismiss being granted post-Twombly and Iqbal had increased. More specifically, 
the dismissal rates increased from 66% to 75% for all civil cases,56 from 70% to 78% 
for civil rights cases, and from 67% to 71% for employment discrimination cases.57
 However, the FJC’s study advised caution in interpreting these results for 
primarily two reasons. First, the FJC found that, in general, there was an increase in 
motions granted with leave to amend, but a decrease in motions granted without 
leave to amend, conceivably providing plaintiffs with more opportunities to fix their 
complaints.58 The FJC found this distinction sufficiently meaningful to break down 
its analysis and present its findings on the basis of whether a motion to dismiss was 
granted with or without prejudice.59
 Second, even though the FJC found an increased dismissal rate in civil cases, it 
did not attribute the increase to Twombly and Iqbal. After controlling for additional 
variables that might explain the higher dismissal rate,60 the FJC found no statistically 
significant increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted (with or 
without an opportunity to amend) for all cases, with the exception of those 
challenging financial instruments.61 Moreover, there was no statistically significant 
increase in the dismissal rate for civil rights and employment discrimination cases.62 
55. Compare Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study: Motions to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal 4 & n.11, 27–31 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., Working Paper, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103 (“[M]issing orders in the Westlaw database are more likely to deny 
motions to dismiss, thereby building a bias into studies that rely on such sources.”), with Moore, supra note 
42, at 608–09, 644–45 (“These results tend to weaken the hypothesis advanced by the FJC that published 
cases are more likely to report the grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss than unpublished cases.”).
56. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at tbl.4. This increase is statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.01 level. Id.
57. Id. This increase is not statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level. Id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 36, 
at 7 (“As for dismissal orders, the FJC found that in every case category that was examined there were 
more orders granting dismissal after Iqbal than there were before Twombly, both with and without 
prejudice. Most importantly, in every case category examined it was more likely that a motion to dismiss 
would be granted.”).
58. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 13. The only case where this was not true was for cases challenging 
financial instruments. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 270 (failing to find a significant rise in dismissal 
rates with prejudice post-Twombly or Iqbal).
59. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 13.
60. The FJC controlled for differences in caseloads among district courts, types of cases, and the existence 
of an amended complaint. Id.
61. Id. at 21. These cases are comprised primarily of individuals challenging lenders or loan servicing 
companies over residential mortgages or refinances and are largely associated with the financial housing 
crisis. Id. at 12. These cases were the only type more likely to be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 21. The 
FJC did not attribute this greater dismissal rate to plaintiffs’ failure to sufficiently plead facts under 
Twombly and Iqbal. Id.
62. Id. at 39 (“[W]e found no statistically significant increase [at the 0.01 or 0.05 level] in the likelihood 
that motions were granted for . . . [non-financial instrument] cases.”).
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In short, the FJC did not attribute the rise in grants of dismissal motions to the 
pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal.
 C. Criticism of the FJC’s Methodology and Interpretation
 The results of the FJC’s long-awaited study surprised many in the legal 
community, including the primary drafter himself.63 This has led to a robust debate 
among academics over what the data means and what is happening on the ground. 
The FJC study is controversial because its outcome was surprising and counter to the 
trend observed by many empiricists and predicted by most scholars. Moreover, the 
study is important because it carries significant weight, as the product of an 
independent agency tasked with conducting research at the request of the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. The FJC’s study directly informs 
policymakers considering whether the relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
need to be amended and whether the civil litigation system needs to be reformed. 
Hence, the robust debate. Some of the major issues are set forth below.
  1. The Role of Statistical Significance
 One critique of the FJC’s study centers around the concept of “statistical 
significance”—how to define it, whether to disclose it, and what meaning to ascribe 
to it. When assessing the results of a quantitative study, a researcher must ascertain 
whether the results are due to an independent variable or to coincidence. To do this, 
a researcher determines the “p-value”—i.e., “[t]he probability of getting, just by 
chance, a test statistic as large as or larger than the observed value.”64 If it is unlikely 
that the same result would occur by chance, the p-value is low, and the result is 
“statistically significant.”65 The FJC’s study set the p-value at 0.05, meaning that for 
a result to be statistically significant there had to be a less-than 5% probability that 
the observed outcome was due to chance, rather than due to an independent variable.
 One criticism of the FJC’s study was whether it should have used the conventional 
0.05 level of statistical significance or a more forgiving one, such as the 0.10 level.66 
This makes a difference because applying a standard above 0.05 yields statistically 
63. Cecil, supra note 55, at 34 (“When we began our study, I also expected that we would find higher grant 
rates [for 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss], at least in civil rights and employment discrimination cases, as 
suggested by almost all of the scholarly commentary that immediately followed Twombly and Iqbal.”).
64. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence 211, 291 (3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/SciMan3D07.pdf/$file/SciMan3D07.pdf.
65. Id. at 291. A relationship whose “existence cannot be explained by chance alone” is “statistically 
significant.” Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies (pt. I), 
59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811, 1813 n.3 (2006).
66. A p-value of 0.10 means that the results are statistically significant if there is a less than a 10% 
probability that the results are due to chance. More specifically, a 0.05 p-value means that to attribute 
the increase in 12(b)(6) filings and dismissals to the new pleading standard, the likelihood of the 
observed outcome being due to chance is 5% or less. At a 0.10 level, the likelihood of the increase being 
due to chance is 10% or less.
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significant increases in the dismissal rate of civil rights and employment 
discrimination cases.67 By selecting the conventional 0.05 measure, the FJC study 
comes to the opposite conclusion. Scholars, such as Professor Lonny Hoffman, 
contend that the 0.05 level is an “inappropriately high threshold” and worry that 
those reading the FJC study—especially policymakers—will consequently conclude 
that Twombly and Iqbal have had no effect on the dismissal rate of such cases.68 This 
misunderstanding may, in turn, undermine efforts to revise the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which are designed to enhance court access.69 However, the FJC’s 
use of the 0.05 level is not uncommon,70 and there are sound reasons for using it. 
Most importantly, the 0.05 level—the standard p-value—helps minimize the risk of 
erroneously concluding that the dismissal increase is due to Twombly and Iqbal when 
it may not be.71
 Whether an empiricist ascribes to the conventional standard or an alternative 
one, critics are correct that the FJC should disclose its results for various “statistical 
significance” standards (i.e., whether the probability value is 0.05, 0.10, or some 
other p-value), and let the reader determine what the appropriate significance level 
should be.72 Such transparency would promote greater understanding of what the 
findings mean and don’t mean. In response to this concern, the FJC has reported the 
statistical significance standards—i.e., the p-values—in its updated report.73
 Statistical significance is important because it enables a reader to discern the 
extent to which an outcome may be explained by chance. However, a finding of no 
statistical significance does not mean that a causal relationship has been affirmatively 
disproved; it only means that chance cannot be ruled out as a potential explanation 
for the observed outcome.74 By not explicitly explaining the limitations of statistical 
67. Letter from Alexander A. Reinert, Assoc. Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, to 
Andrea L. Kuperman, Chief Counsel to the Rules Comm. (Mar. 29, 2011) (on file with author); see 
Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information Forcing, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 & n.4 (2012); see also 
Hoffman, supra note 36, at 26 (“[A]t a lower [threshold of significance] level many of the observed 
differences would have been statistically significant.”).
68. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 17–18 (“By emphasizing that none of the dismissal increases in the [case 
categories other than financial instruments] were statistically significant, the FJC’s study leads readers 
to assume that the study proved Twombly and Iqbal were not responsible for the higher number and rate 
of dismissals, as well as to overlook the effects that were observed.”).
69. Id. at 7 (“[T]he FJC’s work is now being cited as powerful support for the case against pleading rule 
reform.”).
70. Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 599 n.254 (“As the minimally acceptable level of so-called ‘statistical 
significance,’ researchers commonly require a maximum probability of 10%—preferably no higher than 
5%—that the result could have occurred by chance.”); see ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 
Econometrics 18 (2005) (“Levels of significance below 10 percent are rarely accepted.”).
71. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 22.
72. Reinert, supra note 67, at 1; Hoffman, supra note 36, at 25–27.
73. Cecil, supra note 55, at 10 & n.34; Cecil et al., supra note 36, at tbl.4.
74. There are numerous reasons why an outcome may not be statistically significant. Professor Hoffman 
offers four. He contends that: 1) the FJC study may have used empirical models that relied on faulty 
assumptions; 2) the sample size of certain subsets of cases—such as torts and employment discrimination—
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significance, the FJC’s study may lead some policymakers to incorrectly conclude 
that Twombly and Iqbal have affirmatively not affected the dismissal rate.75
 More fundamental than the question of the appropriate level of statistical 
significance is whether one should be used at all. Professor Hoffman faults the FJC 
for not explaining what a no statistical-significance finding means, and urges the 
FJC to give greater attention to an alternative indicator—“substantive significance.”76 
“Substantive significance” means that although the relationship between two 
variables may not be statistically significant, the outcome is practically important.77 
Diminished access to the courts—as demonstrated by an overall increase in the 
number and percentage of dismissal orders—remains problematic. By emphasizing 
statistical over substantive significance, policymakers may not recognize or appreciate 
this problem of access.78 But the debate over statistical versus substantive significance 
seems really about the emphasis given to each type of significance and the implications 
of that choice, rather than whether one should choose one metric to the exclusion of 
the other.79 The author of the FJC report correctly notes that selection between 
statistical and substantive significance is a false choice. The debate is not over which 
to use, given the important role that each plays; statistical significance should merely 
be the starting point that enables researchers to eliminate random selection as an 
explanation for a certain outcome.80
were too small; 3) the threshold of significance level selected (0.05) was too rigorous, thereby masking 
statistically significant results at the 0.10 level; and 4) the use of a two-tailed test (rather than a one-tailed 
test)—although arguably appropriate—prevented most of the dismissal grant increases from reaching the 
0.05 statistical significance threshold. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 22–27. He criticizes the FJC for not 
discussing these possible explanations for a no statistically significant finding in its report and attributes 
reader confusion to this omission. Id. at 8–9, 27.
75. Id. at 9, 17, 19, 22. Moreover, Professor Hatamyar Moore criticizes the FJC’s summary narrative for 
“relentlessly downplay[ing]” findings that demonstrate Iqbal ’s impact by not emphasizing statistically 
significant increases in termination rates and grants with leave to amend in cases, such as civil rights. 
See Moore, supra note 42, at 633–34.
76. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 7 (“By summarily announcing that the observed increases were not 
statistically significant, but not explaining what the technical terminology means (and, as importantly, 
what it does not mean), the study confuses readers into thinking that it demonstrated the Court’s 
decisions had no impact on dismissal practice.”); see also id. at 20–21.
77. See id. at 20–21.
78. Id. at 22. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study confirms the same. Moore, supra note 42, at 
633–34, 634 n.87 (citing another source) (describing “FJC’s focus on ‘statistical significance’ [as] both 
partially inaccurate and substantively misleading”).
79. See Hoffman, supra note 36, at 19–21 (arguing that scholars often focus too much on statistical 
significance and ignore the substantive results); Kaye & Freedman, supra note 64, at 291–92 (“Statistical 
significance does not necessarily establish practical significance. With large samples, small differences 
can be statistically significant.”).
80. Cecil, supra note 55, at 12–14; id. at 13 (“[B]oth statistical significance and substantive significance are 
necessary to determine if the findings represent an important change over time.”).
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  2. Controlling for Independent Variables
 Another dispute fueled by the FJC’s study is the propriety of controlling for 
variables, other than chance, that might explain the decreased dismissal rate. 
Professor Hoffman questions whether the variables chosen by the FJC were, in fact, 
independent of Twombly and Iqbal ’s effects.81 Moreover, Hoffman’s study focuses 
primarily on raw numbers and percentages of filings and dismissals, without 
consideration of mitigating factors. This approach is rebuked by the FJC’s primary 
drafter and others:82
[F]actors other than the courts’ response to the Supreme Court cases are 
plausible explanations for the changes over time. The multinomial models 
[those controlling for factors other than Twombly and Iqbal] allow us to rule 
out plausible alternative explanations and to better isolate the changes 
attributable to the courts’ response to the cases. . . . Our disagreement over 
the role of these multinomial models is at the core of our differences . . . .83
Moreover, the drafter criticizes Professor Hoffman for his selective incorporation of 
and reliance on the multinomial models’ results, noting his inconsistent rejection of 
the FJC’s approach.84
 While we can all agree that the number and percentage of orders granting 
dismissal have gone up post-Iqbal,85 the important question is why. More specifically, 
are Twombly and Iqbal responsible for these changes? The answer to this question, 
from an empirical standpoint, requires that we be able to rule out other factors that 
may explain the observed changes. This cannot happen until consensus is reached 
over how to identify and isolate these potential influences.
81. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 23.
82. Cecil, supra note 55, at 4–8. Other scholars have cautioned against the same. For example, Professor 
Hatamyar Moore states:
It is important to note that inferences—if any—to be drawn from the statistics should 
be confined to the regressions. I believe that the raw frequencies . . . may be of interest 
to the reader. However, multiple factors may affect the ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion, 
and two-way tables cannot account for any confounding effects of other variables. As 
presented in two-way tables, any apparent relationships between the independent 
variables and outcomes can be misleading.
 Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 596–97. Consequently, Professor Hatamyar Moore conducts a multinomial 
logistic regression analysis, in which she controls for the variables pro se status, nature of suit, and 
circuit where the case was brought to see if these independent variables impact the ruling on 12(b)(6) 
motions. Id. at 617. Her updated study is similar. See Moore, supra note 42, at 619–22 (using a 
multinomial logistic regression controlled for independent variables: circuit, type of judge, pro se status, 
class action, and case type).
83. See Cecil, supra note 55, at 5, 8.
84. Id. at 8; see also id. at 17 (“Professor Hoffman seems interested in discussing only those effects that 
indicate an increase in grant rate and ignores any evidence that points in the opposite direction.”).
85. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 11–12, 17.
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  3. The Significance of the Opportunity to Amend
 An important question raised by the FJC study is the significance of a plaintiff 
having an opportunity to amend his or her complaint once a 12(b)(6) motion has 
been granted. The FJC found it relevant that although the percentage of motions 
granted had generally increased, the distribution between those granted with and 
without prejudice had changed.86 The likelihood of a complaint being dismissed 
with prejudice has gone down, while the likelihood of one being dismissed without 
prejudice has gone up.87 The greater likelihood of dismissal with leave to amend 
being granted means that plaintiffs have another bite at the apple.
 But does this extra bite help a plaintiff ultimately survive dismissal? In a follow-up 
study, whose findings were published in a report in November of 2011, the FJC 
found that a plaintiff ’s opportunity to amend the complaint reduced the defendant’s 
success in obtaining a dismissal by approximately 10% post-Iqbal. However, after 
controlling for various variables, this advantage existed at a statistically significant 
level only for those cases challenging financial instruments.88 Moreover, the FJC’s 
initial study indicates that once a plaintiff amends a complaint, that complaint is 
more likely to be dismissed than the original one.89 And certainly, it is no help to 
plaintiffs who don’t have access to information—exclusively within the defendant’s 
possession—to be afforded the opportunity to amend the complaint.90 This pre-
discovery informational asymmetry makes dismissal with the opportunity to amend 
a Pyrrhic victory. Thus, it is little solace that the motions being granted are those 
permitting amendment.
86. Consequently, the FJC decided to conduct its analysis and present its findings on the basis of whether a 
granted dismissal motion was with or without leave to amend. Other scholars have also found the 
increased dismissal rate, largely due to grants with leave to amend. See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 
556, 607–08; id. at 599 (“[T]here was a slight decline in the proportion of motions granted without 
leave to amend from the Database under Conley (40%) to Twombly (39%) to Iqbal (37%). However, the 
percentage of 12(b)(6) motions in the Database that were granted with leave to amend increased from 
6% under Conley to 9% under Twombly to 19% under Iqbal.”). More specifically, Professor Hatamyar 
Moore concluded:
Under Twombly, the odds of a 12(b)(6) motion would be granted with leave to amend, 
rather than denied, were 1.81 times greater than under Conley. Under Iqbal, the odds . . . 
were over 4 times greater than under Conley, holding all other variables constant.
 Id. at 556.
87. Joe S. Cecil et al., Update on Resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) Motions Granted with Leave to 
Amend; Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committeeon Civil Rules 1, 18 (2011). 
More recent studies, however, indicate that this distinction is not dispositive. See text accompanying 
supra note 74.
88. Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 1, 4–5. Like the March 2011 study, the FJC controlled for district court, 
case type, and the existence of an amended complaint. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 19.
90. See Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 600–01 (“In such cases, a grant of a 12(b)(6) motion, even with leave to 
amend, will be just the preliminary step in the dismissal of a complaint (or part thereof) with prejudice.”).
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  4. The Appropriate Data Pool
 Finally, there are a number of questions about the composition of the FJC’s data 
pool. More specifically, the study has been questioned for excluding motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim in response to counterclaims and affirmative 
defenses (such as qualified immunity),91 Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the 
pleadings (whose standard is identical to Rule 12(b)(6)),92 and cases filed by prisoners 
and pro se parties (especially where some courts have applied Iqbal in such cases),93 
while at the same time including motions where the statute of limitations, failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, or other immaterial defenses were raised,94 as well 
as cases governed by a higher pleading standard than Rule 8(a)(2) (such as federal 
securities and fraud cases).95 These choices are material. For example, Professor 
Hatamyar Moore’s early study found that pro se status was the biggest predictor of 
whether a 12(b)(6) motion was granted96 and that pro se litigants were four times 
more likely to have their cases dismissed in response to a 12(b)(6) motion than 
91. See Reinert, supra note 67, at 2; Moore, supra note 42, at 634, 641–42.
92. See Moore, supra note 42, at 641–42. 
93. Reinert, supra note 67, at 2; Hoffman, supra note 36, at 33–34; Moore, supra note 42, at 634, 638–40.
94. Reinert, supra note 67, at 2; Brescia, supra note 10, at 260 (criticizing FJC initial report for looking 
“simply at success rates for all motions to dismiss, regardless of the basis for the motion, including 
motions based on exhaustion of administrative remedies, statute of limitations, and other grounds not 
related directly to the specificity of the pleadings [such as res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
immunity]”); see also Hoffman, supra note 10, at 34–35 (raising the coding of motions and search 
terminology as possible places where FJC may have missed Rule 12(b)(6) activity).
  Other studies have included a wider range of cases in the data set. For example, the Hatamyar 
Moore study excluded cases that were decided under Federal Rule 9(b); cases decided sua sponte under 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006), and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
18 U.S.C.); and cases decided on other grounds, such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction or summary 
judgment under Federal Rule 56. However, Professor Hatamyar Moore included pro se cases decided 
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Moore, supra note 42, at 609; Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 586–87. Kendall 
Hannon’s study excluded fraud cases governed by Federal Rule 9(b)’s particularity pleading standard; 
cases brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, which are subject 
to a more stringent standard under the PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.); and in forma pauperis and pro se cases, which are 
arguably subjected to a lower pleading standard. Hannon, supra note 44, at 1830–34. Cases were also 
removed from the database if they did not ref lect the “spirit” of the search. These included cases 
involving motions for summary judgment, to amend, to reconsider a ruling, and to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1834; see Clemont & Yeazell, supra note 42, at 840–42.
95. See Moore, supra note 42, at 642–43. Federal securities cases brought under the PSLRA and fraud cases 
governed by Rule 9 are subjected to more rigorous pleading standards than Rule 8(a)(2), and therefore 
their inclusion could inf late the percentage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted.
96. See Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 621 (“[B]y far, the variable with the largest predicted effect on whether 
a 12(b)(6) motion will be granted (with or without leave to amend), as opposed to the motion being 
denied, is whether the plaintiff is pro se.”); id. at 623.
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represented litigants.97 This factor is particularly relevant for plaintiffs bringing civil 
rights cases, half of whom are pro se.98
 In its defense, the FJC excluded cases it thought might distort the application of 
the new pleading standard or fail to apply it all together.99 The FJC also excluded 
cases because the disposition did not center on the plaintiff ’s case-in-chief—such as 
those responding to counterclaims, cross-claims, and Rule 12(c) motions.100 
Moreover, supplemental analyses by the FJC indicated that there is no statistically 
significant effect from excluding certain types of cases based on a movant’s chance of 
prevailing post-Iqbal.101
 D. Consensus Among Empiricists
 Although there is substantial debate among empiricists over Twombly and Iqbal ’s 
impact, there is also noteworthy consensus. The FJC and other empiricists agree that 
there are more 12(b)(6) motions being granted post-Iqbal.102 According to the FJC:
Even if the rate at which motions are granted remains unchanged over time, 
the total number of cases with motions granted may still increase. The 7% 
increase in case filings combined with the increase in the rate at which 
motions are filed in 2010 may result in more cases in recent years, with 
motions granted, even though the rate at which motions are granted has 
remained the same.103
 The FJC and other empiricists also agree that the FJC’s initial study is subject to 
limitations. It does not take into account the substantive law upon which cases were 
97. Id. at 621. Professor Brescia’s study also found that pro se litigants, which comprised a quarter of the 
cases analyzed, were at a distinct disadvantage in the dismissal rates of employment and housing 
discrimination cases post-Iqbal. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 272–73.
98. Hatamyar, supra note 51, at 613. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study confirms the same. See 
Moore, supra note 42, at 615–17, 622, 626.
99. Cecil, supra note 55, at 21–23.
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 25.
102. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 241 (“[T]wo things are clear: motions to dismiss challenging the sufficiency 
of the pleadings are much more common since Iqbal, and far more cases are being dismissed after the 
release of that decision than before. At least in this regard, then, the initial fears about the impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal seem well founded, regardless of whether dismissal rates have changed dramatically.”); 
id. at 262 (“[A]part from the mere dismissal rate, the number of cases in which complaints were 
dismissed, either in whole or in part, rose dramatically after Iqbal.”).
103. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 22; see also Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 5 (finding an increased filing 
rate of 12(b)(6) motions combined with stable grant rate results in overall increase in percentage of cases 
dismissed); Cecil, supra note 55, at 11 (stating that prior study “explicitly acknowledges that increases in 
filing rates of motions to dismiss due to Twombly and Iqbal may result in an increase in the number of 
motions granted even if the grant rate remains unchanged”).
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decided,104 or the change in the pleading practices of the plaintiffs’ bar.105 The study 
cannot discern whether plaintiffs are deterred from filing valid cases post-Twombly 
and Iqbal,106 or whether meritorious cases have been dismissed.107
 The study also has design limitations. It did not: examine motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) that were filed after the first ninety days of a 
case;108 cover all types of cases (e.g., anti-trust cases were excluded); include all 
relevant motions and orders;109 exclude cases dismissed for reasons other than 
insufficient factual pleadings;110 or focus on cases more vulnerable to dismissal 
because of informational asymmetry.111 Critics have been the catalyst for a variety of 
subsequent changes, ranging from the FJC’s disclosing results at different p-values, 
to including pro se cases and those containing counterclaims and cross-claims.112
104. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 22; Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 5.
105. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 22–23, 23 n.37; Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 5 (“Nor were we able to 
take into account changes in pleading practice, or the fact that recent complaints are more likely to 
include a recitation of facts that support the claim.”); Moore, supra note 42, at 609.
106. Cecil, supra note 55, at 18 (“These findings do not prove that cases are not being deterred from filing in 
federal court . . . .”); Hoffman, supra note 36, at 28–30; Moore, supra note 42, at 609; cf. Miller, supra note 
10, at 77 (discussing the likelihood of Twombly and Iqbal in deterring plaintiffs from filing potentially 
meritorious cases because of a more rigorous pleading standard and increased costs associated with 
defending against a 12(b)(6) motion); Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting, supra note 10, at 102–03 
(discussing the more rigorous pleading standard’s potential chilling effect on filing meritorious cases).
107. Cecil, supra note 55, at 1 n.2; Moore, supra note 42, at 609; cf. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of 
Heightened Pleading, 86 Ind. L.J. 119 (2011) (suggesting that Iqbal and Twombly have not helped filter 
out meritless cases).
108. Cecil, supra note 55, at 10 (“We acknowledge that the filing rates for motions to dismiss throughout the 
life of the case will be higher than the rates we found after 90 days, and noted this in our report.”); 
Hoffman, supra note 36, at 33. The FJC study has also been criticized for limiting its data pool to only 
six-month periods in 2006 and 2010 and to only twenty-three federal district courts. See Moore, supra 
note 42, at 637–38, 634–35.
109. Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 1. The FJC is attempting to locate the missing motions and orders and to 
subsequently reanalyze the data to see if these errors change the outcome. Cecil, supra note 55, at 3–4.
110. Cecil, supra note 55, at 37 (“[O]ur method may have its own shortcomings (such as including some 
irrelevant cases that are not affected by the Twombly/Iqbal standard)….”); Cecil et al., supra note 36, 
at 23; Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 5 (“Unfortunately, we were not able to restrict this study to 
motions that involve issues of the sufficiency of the factual pleadings.”); Moore, supra note 41, at 609; 
Hoffman, supra note 36, at 30–31; see Brescia, supra note 10, at 260 (“[S]imply at success rates for all 
motions to dismiss, regardless of the basis for the motion, including motions based on exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, statute of limitations, and other grounds not related directly to the specificity 
of the pleadings.”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 42, at 839 n.66 (stating that because only a subset of 
12(b)(6) motions challenge the factual sufficiency of allegations under Twombly and Iqbal, the total 
number of 12(b)(6) motions will hide the impact of such cases); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About 
Twombly-Iqbal, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1337, 1366 n.140 (2010).
111. Cecil et al., supra note 87, at 5 (“These findings do not rule out the possibility that the pleading standards 
established in Twombly and Iqbal may have a greater effect in narrower categories of cases in which 
respondents must obtain the facts from movants in order to state a claim.”); Cecil, supra note 55, at 1 n.2.
112. Cecil, supra note 55, at 1 n.3.
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 The FJC continues to do important empirical work in the pre-trial area and there 
are additional promising initiatives being taken by the FJC. For example, the FJC 
has proposed a comprehensive study of pre-trial dispositive motions to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules. Based on collaboration between the FJC and various 
scholars, the study will examine the role and interaction of such motions, and motion 
practice changes over time.113 Additionally, at the behest of Judge Lee Rosenthal, a 
pilot project has been developed to provide a new pre-trial procedure in federal 
employment cases that may improve litigation efficiency and discovery.114
 E. Recent Studies Suggest Compromised Viability of Civil Rights Cases
 More recent empirical studies following the FJC’s reports indicate that the 
viability of civil rights cases under the new federal pleading standard has been 
compromised. In an updated study attempting to replicate the FJC’s study,115 
Professor Hatamyar Moore found a substantially greater dismissal rate post-Iqbal 
than the FJC did.116 Her updated study—which included a larger sample of post-
Iqbal cases—indicated that, in general, 12(b)(6) motions were more likely to be 
granted in full (with and without leave to amend) post-Iqbal.117 Courts granted such 
113. Memorandum from Joe Cecil, Senior Research Associate, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. David Campbell, 
Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1–3 (Mar. 13, 2012).
114. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Pilot Project Regarding Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment 
Cases Alleging Adverse Action (2011). This pilot project “creates a new category of information 
exchange, replacing initial disclosures with initial discovery specific to employment cases alleging 
adverse action.” Id. at 2. Both sides are entitled to this discovery thirty days after the defendant files a 
responsive pleading or motion. Id. Under this new process, both sides are also required to disclose 
certain information and documents to assist the parties in narrowing the issues and streamlining 
subsequent discovery. Id. This system replaces the initial disclosure process, but does not preclude 
further discovery. Id. at 1–15.
115. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study is based on the same design as her original one, except she 
increased the number of randomly selected federal district court opinions ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion 
from 200 to 500 in the year following Iqbal. Moore, supra note 42, at 609–10. Like her prior study, she 
examined only those orders published in the Westlaw database. Id. at 612. The study excluded dismissals 
on grounds other than 12(b)(6). Id. at 610–11. Cases involving a more rigorous pleading standard—such 
as those alleging fraud or a PSLRA violation—were also excluded. Id. at 610–11. The study included 
pro se cases that were consistent with the 12(b)(6) procedural posture and the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading 
standard. After applying these exclusions and inclusions, Hatamyar Moore examined a total of 1326 
cases in the database: 444 under Conley, 422 under Twombly, and 460 under Iqbal. Id. at 604, 611.
  In an attempt to replicate the results of the FJC’s study, Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated 
study removed pro se plaintiffs’ cases and limited the time frame to cases decided in 2006 and 2010. Id. 
at 608. However, her updated study differed because it drew cases from eighty-six rather than twenty-
three federal district courts; relied on the entire 2006 calendar year, but only the first six months of 
2010; and included only Westlaw-published cases. See id. at 643–44.
116. Id. at 608–09.
117. Id. at 614. This study found that 61% of motions were granted under Iqbal, in comparison to 46% under 
Conley. Id. at 609. Moreover, cases are more likely to be terminated under Iqbal than Conley. Id. at 
624–26, 648–50.
742
The Jury (or More AccurATely The Judge) is sTill ouT
motions at an even higher rate for constitutional civil rights cases.118 This is true even 
when pro se plaintiffs were excluded.119
 Another recent empirical study by Professor Raymond Brescia focused exclusively 
on a database of employment and housing discrimination cases, and also offers 
promise for understanding the impact of the new federal pleading standard on the 
viability of civil rights cases. Although the study found little impact on the dismissal 
rates post-Twombly in employment and housing cases, it found a considerable increase 
post-Iqbal for such cases.120 Unlike other empirical studies, Professor Brescia’s study 
is unique in its focus on a discrete subset of civil rights cases and on dismissals based 
on the sufficiency of the factual allegations pled.121
 Not only do more recent studies conclude that civil rights complaints are more 
vulnerable to dismissal post-Iqbal, but the studies demonstrate that this vulnerability 
exists—at a statistically significant level—regardless of whether a judge grants leave 
to amend the complaint. While the increase in dismissals is largely attributable to 
grants with leave to amend,122 there is now evidence that grants without leave to 
amend are on the rise. Civil rights plaintiffs run a greater risk of having their 
complaints dismissed with prejudice and in their entirety. For example, in his 
examination of employment and housing discrimination cases, Professor Brescia 
found that courts were not only more likely to dismiss such cases post-Iqbal, but to 
dismiss them with prejudice.123 Likewise, Professor Hatamyar Moore’s updated study 
indicates that the risk that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be granted with prejudice, 
compared to denied, was 1.75 times greater under Iqbal than Conley.124 Unlike 
Professor Hatamyar Moore’s prior study, her updated study found that this risk was 
statistically significant.125 Moreover, unlike her prior study, the probability of a 
118. Id. at 618–19. The study found that 64% of motions were granted under Iqbal for constitutional civil 
rights cases, in comparison to 41% under Conley. Id. at 619. Moreover, for constitutional civil rights 
cases, courts were 3.77 times more likely to grant in full a motion to dismiss with prejudice under Iqbal 
than under Conley. Id. at 623 & tbl.4. And for a motion to dismiss without prejudice, the courts were 
fourteen times more likely to grant the motion in full, rather than deny, under Iqbal. Id. at 623.
119. Id. at 618–19.
120. Brescia, supra note 10, at 239–40. Professor Brescia examined the impact of the new federal pleading 
standard on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and motions for judgment 
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) in employment and housing discrimination cases. Id. at 239. The 
study included claims brought under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disability 
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, the Fair Housing 
Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and retaliation provisions. Id. at 266. He limited his study to federal 
district court orders in the Lexis database that assessed the factual specificity of the pleadings forty-one 
months before Twombly, twenty-four months between Twombly and Iqbal, and nineteen months after 
Iqbal. Id. at 262–63. He also excluded pro se cases. Id. at 268. His study does not control for factors the 
FJC did, such as circuit and district courts, or amended complaints.
121. Id. at 260.
122. Moore, supra note 42, at 606–08, 621.
123. See Brescia, supra note 10, at 260–61, 268–70.
124. Moore, supra note 42, at 605.
125. Id. at 605, 621.
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plaintiff ’s case being entirely dismissed with prejudice was 1.71 times greater under 
Iqbal than Conley, a statistically significant rate.126 The risk was even worse for civil 
rights cases at 3.77 times greater.127 Thus, whatever optimism existed because 
plaintiffs could at least amend their complaints post-dismissal has been dampened.
 But the battle of the experts continues. The author of the FJC’s report criticizes 
these new studies as well. Professor Hatamyar Moore’s study is taken to task for 
excluding certain relevant variables,128 relying on the Westlaw database,129 and using 
f lawed search terms for capturing post-Iqbal decisions.130 Similarly, Professor Brescia’s 
study is faulted for relying on the Lexis database, not controlling for certain variables, 
and using pre-Twombly cases that are atypical of pleadings practice at the time.131 
This battle is unlikely to be won anytime soon.132
iV.  aCCUratELY assEssing thE pOst-tWOMbLY and iQbaL LandsCapE Using 
bar and bEnCh fEEdbaCK
 The empirical data, although important, clearly cannot tell the whole story. 
There are other indicia of impact, drawing on feedback from the bar and bench, that 
policymakers should consult.
 A. Lawyers’ Perspectives
 One source of feedback is the lawyers themselves, those in the trenches who 
litigate civil rights and employment discrimination cases every day. Although some 
lawyers report not seeing an impact of the new pleading standard on their practices,133 
the plaintiffs’ bar is responding to 12(b)(6) motions that they never would have faced 
before Twombly and Iqbal. In a survey of lawyers with the National Employment 
Lawyers Association (NELA), 75% reported this to be the case.134 Practitioners 
126. Id. at 605.
127. Id. at 623 & tbl.4 (“[I]n constitutional civil rights cases courts were 3.77 times more likely to grant 
motions to dismiss in full without leave to amend, as compared to deny, under Iqbal than under Conley.”).
128. Cecil, supra note 55, 25–27.
129. Id. at 27–31.
130. Id. at 31–34.
131. Id. at 36–37. A follow-up study of a subset of employment and housing discrimination cases by the FJC 
found an increase in the dismissal rate that did not meet the conventional standard of statistical 
significance. Id. at 35–36.
132. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access 
to Discovery, 121 Yale L.J. 2270 (2012) (finding that Twombly and Iqbal have a negative impact on 15 
to 21% of plaintiffs who face 12(b)(6) motions).
133. See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs 
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation 25 (2010) (finding that telephone interviews with 
thirty-five attorneys revealed that most did not see a change in their practices).
134. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Attorney Satisfaction with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
12 (2010).
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revealed that they have changed their pleading practices, when possible, to 
accommodate the more rigorous pleading standard. For example, employment 
lawyers report making more factual allegations in their complaints following the 
Supreme Court’s seminal pleadings decisions.135 In addition, 70% of NELA lawyers 
who filed employment discrimination cases post-Twombly said they changed the way 
they structured their complaints.136 Of those attorneys, 94% included more factual 
allegations in their complaint post-Twombly.137 Some lawyers have been chilled or 
discouraged from bringing potentially meritorious cases altogether.138
 B. Judicial Trends
 Another source for learning about the impact of the new pleading standard is the 
judges themselves, those actually deciding these dispositive motions. Some district 
courts are dialing back139 from what initially seemed like a rigid pleadings approach 
and a bleak picture for the viability of civil rights and employment discrimination 
cases. Although the federal courts of appeals affirm most 12(b)(6) dismissals under 
Iqbal,140 some courts are emphasizing a f lexible, context-specific approach whose 
leniency is dependent on the circumstances.141 In line with this approach, some 
135. Id.
136. See id. at 11–12.
137. See id. at 12.
138. See Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Restoring Access to Justice: The Impact of Iqbal and 
Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation 9-10 (Sept. 2010). For example, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, 
legal scholar and partner at Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, explained the impact Twombly 
and Iqbal had on her plaintiff-based practice by stating:
We spend a lot more time [crafting pleadings] and I will say that we do reject some 
cases that we believe do have merit because the truth is implausible on its face. History 
is just one implausible thing after another, and sometimes what happens to people is 
implausible, too . . . . So, it has had an impact, probably more on my clients and 
potential clients than on our law firm.
 ACS Convention Panel: Access to Federal Courts after Iqbal and Twombly, supra note 41. The FJC’s 
empirical data, however, does not support this conclusion. See Cecil, supra note 55, at 34 (“These 
findings do not prove that cases are not being deterred from filing in federal court . . . . Nevertheless, 
these findings offer no support to those who believe that such deterrence is taking place, and no better 
evidence appears to be available.”).
139. For example, Professor Patricia Hatamyar Moore’s updated study found that from 2009 to 2010, the 
rate of federal district courts’ grants of 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss with leave to amend decreased, while 
denials increased. Moore, supra note 42, at 647. Among other explanations for the difference between 
2009 and 2010, she noted that “[o]ne could speculate that district courts overread Iqbal in 2009, and 
after receiving ‘appellate court guidance,’ backed off in 2010.” Id.
140. Moore, supra note 42, at 626–27. Of the roughly one hundred appellate court cases collected by the 
Civil Rules Law Clerk up to July 26, 2010, 73% of them affirmed district court grants of 12(b)(6) 
motions. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Hon. Lee A. Rosenthal, to Civil 
Rules Comm. & Standing Rules Comm. (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Kuperman Memo], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_072610.pdf. Of the forty-six 
civil rights dismissals under 12(b)(6), 74% of them were affirmed. Id.
141. Cecil et al., supra note 36, at 2–3.
745
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
district court judges are permitting pleading “upon information and belief ” when 
appropriate, and liberally granting leave to amend, as confirmed by the empirical 
data.142 And, rather than ruling immediately on a motion to dismiss, some judges are 
even permitting the parties to take limited, targeted discovery before ruling on a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which the defendant claims that the plaintiff ’s claims 
are implausible.143 This approach—which I have advocated elsewhere144—addresses 
the informational asymmetry problem and levels the playing field for civil rights 
claimants who cannot get court access because of defendants’ exclusive possession of 
critical evidence pre-discovery.
 Moreover, in a study of employment and housing discrimination cases conducted 
by Professor Brescia, it seems the manner in which many judges are using the 
plausibility standard does not comport with the way the Supreme Court used it in 
Twombly and Iqbal; they are rarely dismissing a case if there exists an equally 
plausible, legal alternative explanation for a defendant’s conduct, and are rarely 
appearing to explicitly invoke their “ judicial experience and common sense.”145 To 
determine how and to what extent district court judges are using the plausibility test, 
Professor Brescia examined a subset of ninety-eight post-Iqbal cases in which motions 
to dismiss were granted in full with prejudice and non-disparate impact claims were 
raised exclusively. Professor Brescia concluded that only about half of these cases 
applied the Twombly and/or Iqbal plausibility standard and, where the standard was 
cited, rarely did district courts do more than simply insert boilerplate language about 
the new standard. Professor Brescia found that in only 4% of the ninety-eight cases 
did the court apply the “more plausible” test, i.e., comparing the plaintiff ’s allegations 
to an alternative explanation for defendant’s conduct.146
 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself reminded litigants of the relative ease with 
which pleadings can be brought in Skinner v. Switzer,147 citing pre-Twombly and Iqbal 
case law. Unfortunately, not much can be read into Skinner. While the Court in 
Skinner reiterates Rule 8’s requirement that only a short and plain statement of a 
142. Id. at 1 n.4; Kuperman Memo, supra note 140, at 4–5, 35.
143. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“If the 
plaintiff shows that he can’t conduct an even minimally adequate investigation without limited 
discovery, the judge presumably can allow that discovery, meanwhile deferring ruling on the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.”); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(allowing a pro se prisoner limited discovery to ascertain names of defendants); Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., 
Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 
amended complaint after the court permitted discovery so the plaintiffs could gather facts to meet 
antitrust pleading requirements); In re Netf lix Antitrust Litig., 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 321 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (allowing for limited discovery under Twombly); see Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting, 
supra note 10, at 131 n.388, 137–38.
144. See generally Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting, supra note 10.
145. Brescia, supra note 10, at 240–41.
146. See id. at 279.
147. 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011) (holding that plaintiff, a death row inmate, had alleged a plausible claim 
that the State of Texas violated his constitutional rights by denying him access to DNA evidence to 
challenge his conviction).
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claim is necessary, and reminds the lower courts that a plaintiff need not pin down 
his precise legal theory at the pleadings stage or give an “exposition of his legal 
argument,” the Court still requires that a plaintiff set forth a plausible claim.148
 And in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,149 the Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the dismissal of a securities fraud class action at 
the pleading stage.150 However, the Court’s holding that plaintiffs adequately pled the 
elements of materiality and scienter—while good for investors alleging violations of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5—is too specific to offer any broad pleadings lessons.151
V. COnCLUsiOn
 In sum, the civil litigation landscape is evolving. Emboldened by Twombly and 
Iqbal, defendants are filing more 12(b)(6) motions to eliminate cases earlier in the 
pipeline, and the plaintiffs’ bar is adapting by changing its pleading practices or 
foregoing litigation altogether. More cases are being dismissed, and at greater rates 
for those with leave to amend. It remains unclear to what extent this trend is related 
to the more onerous pleadings bar established by these seminal cases. The courts 
continue to shape the contours of the pleading terrain, exercising their discretion in 
ways more sympathetic than initially envisioned. Trial by jury, or trial by motion? 
For civil rights and employment discrimination cases, the jury (or, more accurately, 
the judge) is still out.
148. Id. at 1296.
149. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (applying the plausibility standard, the Court held that plaintiff-shareholders 
had alleged facts plausibly suggesting that reasonable investors would have considered Matrixx’s reports 
of the adverse effects of a new nasal spray material to their investment decisions, and that Matrixx acted 
with the requisite state of mind to defraud investors).
150. Id. at 1313–14.
151. See id. at 1322, 1325.
